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PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS TO THE 
SUPREME COURT 
William H Rehnquist * 
Justice Rehnquist was a "Jurist in Residence" at the University of Minnesota Law 
School for several days in October 1984. He delivered the following address on 
October 19. The topic is as timely now as it was then. We are, therefore, most 
grateful for Justice Rehnquist's permission to publish the speech. 
One of the proud and just boasts of the constitutional system of 
government that we have in the United States is that even the Presi-
dent is not above the law. The justness of the boast is illustrated by 
decisions such as the Steel Seizure Case, in which the Court rebuffed 
the claims of President Truman, and the Nixon Tapes Case, in 
which the Court rebuffed the claims of President Nixon. But 
though the President, the head of the executive branch, may be sub-
ject under our system to checks and balances administered by the 
judicial branch of government, the courts themselves are subject to 
a different form of check and balance administered by the President. 
Vacancies in the federal judiciary are filled by the President with the 
advice and consent of the United States Senate. Just as the courts 
may have their innings with the President, the President comes to 
have his innings with the courts. It seems fitting, particularly in the 
year of a presidential election, to inquire what history shows as to 
the propensity of Presidents to "pack" the Court, and the extent to 
which they have succeeded in any such effort. 
I use the word "pack" as the best verb available, realizing full 
well that it has a highly pejorative connotation. But it ought not to 
have such a connotation when used in this context; the second edi-
tion of Webster's unabridged dictionary, which happens to be the 
one I have in my study, defines the verb "pack" as "to choose or 
arrange (a jury, committee, etc.) in such a way as to secure some 
advantage, or to favor some particular side or interest." Thus a 
President who sets out to "pack" the Court seeks to appoint people 
to the Court who are sympathetic to his political or philosophical 
principles. 
• Associate Justice, United States Supreme Court. 
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There is no reason in the world why a President should not do 
this. One of the many marks of genius which our Constitution 
bears is the fine balance struck in the establishment of the judicial 
branch, avoiding both subservience to the supposedly more vigor-
ous legislative and executive branches, on the one hand, and total 
institutional isolation from public opinion on the other. The per-
formance of the judicial branch of the United States government for 
a period of nearly two hundred years has shown it to be remarkably 
independent of the other coordinate branches of that government. 
Yet the institution has been constructed in such a way that the pub-
lic will, in the person of the President of the United States-the one 
official who is elected by the entire nation-have something to say 
about the membership of the Court, and thereby indirectly about its 
decisions. 
Surely we would not want it any other way. We want our fed-
eral courts, and particularly the Supreme Court of the United 
States, to be independent of popular opinion when deciding the par-
ticular cases or controversies that come before them. The provision 
for tenure during good behavior and the prohibition against diminu-
tion of compensation have proved more than adequate to secure 
that sort of independence. The result is that the Justices are respon-
sible to no electorate or constituency. But the manifold provisions 
of the Constitution with which judges must deal are by no means 
crystal clear in their import, and reasonable minds may differ as to 
which interpretation is proper. When a vacancy occurs on the 
Court, it is entirely appropriate that that vacancy be filled by the 
President, responsible to a national constituency, as advised by the 
Senate, whose members are responsible to regional constituencies. 
Thus, public opinion has some say in who shall become Justices of 
the Supreme Court. 
The answer to the first question I posed-have Presidents in 
the past attempted to "pack" the Court-is easy; the Presidents 
who have been sensible of the broad powers that they have pos-
sessed, and been willing to exercise those powers, have all but invar-
iably tried to have some influence on the philosophy of the Court as 
a result of their appointments to that body. This should come as a 
surprise to no one. 
The answer to the second question that I posed-how success-
ful have Presidents been in their efforts to pack the Court-is more 
problematical. I think history teaches us that those who have tried 
have been at least partially successful, but that a number of factors 
militate against a President having anything more than partial sue-
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cess. What these factors are I will try to illustrate with examples 
from the history of the Court. 
Very early in the history of the Court, Justice William Cush-
ing, "a sturdy Federalist and follower of Marshall,"' died in Sep-
tember 1810. His death reduced the seven-member Court to six, 
evenly divided between Federalist appointees and Republican ap-
pointees. Shortly after Cushing's death, Thomas Jefferson, two 
years out of office as President, wrote to his former Secretary of the 
Treasury, Albert Gallatin, in these unseemingly gleeful words: 
I observe old Cushing is dead. At length, then, we have a chance of getting a 
Republican majority in the Supreme judiciary. For ten years has that branch 
braved the spirit and will of the Nation . . . . The event is a fortunate one, and so 
timed as to be a godsend to me. 2 
Jefferson, of course, had been succeeded by James Madison, 
who, though perhaps less ardently than Jefferson, also championed 
Republican ideals. Jefferson wrote Madison that "it will be difficult 
to find a character of firmness enough to preserve his independence 
on the same Bench with Marshall. "3 When he heard that Madison 
was considering Joseph Story and Ezekiel Bacon, then Chairman of 
the Ways and Means Committee of the House of Representatives, 
he admonished Madison that "Story and Bacon are exactly the men 
who deserted us [on the Embargo Act]. The former [is] unquestion-
ably a tory, and both are too young."4 
President Madison seems to have been "snake-bit" in his effort 
to fill the Cushing vacancy. He first nominated his Attorney Gen-
eral, Levi Lincoln, who insisted from the first that he did not want 
the job; even after the Senate confirmed him he still refused to serve. 
Madison then nominated a complete dark horse, one Alexander 
Wolcott, a political hack who was the Federal Revenue Collector of 
Connecticut. The Senate, controlled by his party, rejected Wolcott 
by the mortifying vote of twenty-four-to-nine. Finally, in the midst 
of a cabinet crisis that occupied a good deal of this time, Madison 
nominated Joseph Story for the Cushing vacancy, and the Senate 
confirmed him as a matter of routine three days later. 
Story, of course, fulfilled Jefferson's worst expectations about 
him. He became Chief Justice Marshall's principal ally on the great 
legal issues of the day in the Supreme Court, repeatedly casting his 
vote in favor of national power and against the restrictive interpre-
I. N. SCHACHNER, THOMAS JEFFERSON: A BIOGRAPHY 901 (1951). 
2. /d. 
3. G. DUNNE, JUSTICE JOSEPH STORY AND THE RISE OF THE SUPREME COURT 77 
(1970). 
4. /d. at 78-79. 
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tation of the Constitution urged by Jefferson and his states' -rights 
school. And Joseph Story served on the Supreme Court for thirty-
four years, one of the longest tenures of record. 
Presidents who wish to pack the Supreme Court, like murder 
suspects in a detective novel, must have both motive and opportu-
nity. Here Madison had both, and yet he failed. He was probably a 
considerably less partisan Chief Executive than Jefferson, and so his 
motivation was perhaps not strong enough. After having botched 
several opportunities, he finally preferred to nominate someone who 
would not precipitate another crisis in his relations with the Senate, 
rather than insisting on a nominee who had the right philosophical 
credentials. 
The lesson, I suppose, that can be drawn from this incident is 
that while for Court-watchers the President's use of his appoint-
ment power to nominate people for vacancies on the Supreme Court 
is the most important use he makes of the executive authority, for 
the President himself the filling of the Supreme Court vacancies is 
just one of many acts going on under the "big top" of his 
administration. 
Abraham Lincoln had inveighed against the Supreme Court's 
1857 decision in the Dred Scott case during his famous debates with 
Stephen A. Douglas in 1858, when both sought to be elected United 
States Senator from Illinois. Lincoln lost that election, but his suc-
cessful presidential campaign two years later was likewise marked 
by a restrained but nonetheless forceful attack on this decision and 
by implication on the Court's apparent institutional bias in favor of 
slaveholders. Within two months of his inauguration, by reason of 
the death of one Justice and the resignation of two others, Lincoln 
was given three vacancies on the Supreme Court to fill. To fill them 
Lincoln chose Noah Swayne of Ohio, David Davis of Illinois, and 
Samuel F. Miller of Iowa. All were Republicans who had rendered 
some help in getting Lincoln elected President in 1860; indeed, Da-
vis had been one of Lincoln's principal managers at the Chicago 
convention of the Republican Party in that year. 
In 1863, by reason of expansion in the membership of the 
Court, Lincoln was enabled to name still another Justice, and he 
chose Stephen J. Field of California, a War Democrat who had been 
the chief justice of that state's supreme court. In 1864, Chief Justice 
Roger B. Taney finally died at the age of 88, and Lincoln had an 
opportunity to choose a new Chief Justice. 
At this time, in the fall of 1864, the constitutionality of the so-
called "greenback legislation" that the government had used to fi-
nance the war effort was headed for a Court test, and Lincoln was 
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very much aware of this fact. He decided to appoint his Secretary 
of the Treasury, Salmon P. Chase, who was in many respects the 
architect of the greenback legislation, saying to a confidant that 
(w]e wish for a Chief Justice who will sustain what has been done in regard to 
emancipation and the legal tenders. We cannot ask a man what he will do, and if 
we should, and he should answer us, we should despise him for it. Therefore, we 
must take a man whose opinions are known.5 
In all, then, Lincoln had five appointments. How successful 
was Lincoln at "packing" the Court with these appointments? The 
answer has to be, I believe, that he was very successful at first. In 
the all-important Prize Cases, decided in 1863, the three Lincoln 
appointees already on the Court-Swayne, Miller, and Davis-
joined with Justices Wayne and Grier of the old Court to make up 
the majority, while Chief Justice Taney and Justices Nelson, Ca-
tron, and Clifford dissented. It seems obvious that this case would 
have been decided the other way had the same Justices been on the 
Court who had decided the Dred Scott case six years earlier. 
Charles Warren, in his The Supreme Court in United States History, 
describes these cases as being not only "the first cases arriving out 
of the Civil War to be decided by [the court], but they were far 
more momentous in the issue involved than any other case; and 
their final determination favorable to the government's contention 
was almost a necessary factor in the suppression of the war. "6 
Immediately after the war, a host of new issues arose that 
could not readily have been foreseen at the time that Lincoln made 
his first appointments to the Supreme Court. The extent to which 
military tribunals might displace civil courts during time of war or 
insurrection was decided by the Supreme Court in 1866 in the fa-
mous case of Ex parte Milligan. 7 While the Court was unanimous as 
to one aspect of this case, it divided five-to-four on the equally im-
portant question of whether Congress might provide for trial by 
military commissions during time of insurrection even though the 
President alone could not. On this point Justices Field and Davis, 
Lincoln appointees, joined Justices Nelson, Grier, and Clifford of 
the old Court to hold that neither Congress nor the President might 
do so, while Chief Justice Chase and Justices Miller and Swayne (all 
appointed by Lincoln) joined Justice Wayne of the old Court in 
holding that Congress might establish such courts even though the 
President alone could not. 
During the post-war Reconstruction Era, three new amend-
5. 2 C. WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 401 (1922). 
6. /d. at 380-81. 
7. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866). 
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ments to the United States Constitution were promulgated, and the 
construction of those amendments was also necessarily on the 
agenda of the Supreme Court. The first important case involving 
the fourteenth amendment to come before the Court was that of the 
Slaughterhouse Cases, in which the applicability of the provisions of 
that amendment to claims not based on racial discrimination was 
taken up by the Court. Of the Lincoln appointees, Justice Miller 
wrote the majority opinion and was joined in it by Justice Davis, 
while Chief Justice Chase and Justices Field and Swayne were in 
dissent. 
The ultimate irony in Lincoln's effort to pack the Court was 
the Court's first decision in the so-called Legal Tender Cases, 
Hepburn v. Griswold.s In 1870 the Court held, in an opinion by 
Chief Justice Chase, who had been named Chief Justice by Lincoln 
primarily for the purpose of upholding the greenback legislation, 
that this legislation was unconstitutional. Justice Field joined the 
opinion of the Chief Justice, while the other three Lincoln appoin-
tees-Miller, Swayne, and Davis-dissented. Chief Justice Chase's 
vote in the Legal Tender Cases is a textbook example of the proposi-
tion that one may look at a legal question differently as a judge than 
one did as a member of the executive branch. There is no reason to 
believe that Chase thought he was acting unconstitutionally when 
he helped draft and shepherd through Congress the greenback legis-
lation, and it may well be that if Lincoln had actually posed the 
question to him before nominating him as Chief Justice, Chase 
would have agreed that the measures were constitutional. But ad-
ministrators in charge of a program, even if they are lawyers, simply 
do not ponder these questions in the depth that judges do, and 
Chase's vote in the Legal Tender Cases is proof of this fact. 
In assessing Lincoln's success in his effort to pack the Court, it 
seems that with regard to the problems he foresaw at the time of his 
first appointments-the difficulties that the Supreme Court might 
put in the way of successfully fighting the Civil War-Lincoln was 
preeminently successful in his efforts. But with respect to issues 
that arose after the war-the use of military courts, the constitu-
tionality of the greenback legislation, and the construction of the 
fourteenth amendment-his appointees disagreed with one another 
regularly. Perhaps the lesson to be drawn from these examples is 
that judges may think very much alike with respect to one issue, but 
quite differently from one another with respect to other issues. And 
while both Presidents and judicial nominees may know the current 
constitutional issues of importance, neither of them is usually 
8. 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 603 (1870). 
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vouchsafed the foresight to see what the great issues of ten or fifteen 
years hence are to be. 
Probably the most obvious laboratory test for success in pack-
ing the Court is the experience of President Franklin D. Roosevelt 
with his judicial appointments. Franklin Roosevelt had both mo-
tive and opportunity in abundance. He was elected President in 
1932, and his first term in office was notable for the enactment of 
many important social and economic regulatory measures. But it 
seemed during these four years that no sooner were these New Deal 
measures signed into law by the President than they were invali-
dated by the Supreme Court. That Court, referred to in those days 
as the "Nine Old Men," had on it Justices appointed by Presidents 
Taft, Wilson, Harding, Coolidge, and Hoover. Though the out-
comes in many cases were close, during Roosevelt's first term the 
Court struck down such important pieces of New Deal legislation 
as the NRA and the AAA. 
In November 1936, President Roosevelt won a landslide reelec-
tion victory, with his Republican opponent carrying only the states 
of Maine and Vermont. Frustrated during his first term by the lack 
of any vacancies on the Supreme Court, Roosevelt disdained to wait 
longer for vacancies and in effect took the bull by the horns. In his 
famous "Court-packing plan" proposed in February 1937, he 
sought authority from Congress to enlarge the membership of the 
Court to as many as fifteen Justices; the President would have the 
authority to appoint an additional Justice for each member of the 
Court over seventy years of age who chose not to retire. This mea-
sure was shot down in flames in the Senate, a Senate that the Demo-
crats controlled by a margin of five-to-one. But in the very course 
of the battle over this legislation, Justice Van Devanter, who had 
been appointed to the Court by President Taft in 1910, announced 
his intention to retire, and during the next four years there occurred 
six additional vacancies on the Court. The power to remake the 
Court, which Roosevelt had unsuccessfully sought from Congress, 
was given him by the operation of the actuarial tables. 
There is no doubt that President Roosevelt was keenly aware 
of the importance of judicial philosophy in a Justice of the Supreme 
Court; if he had not been, he never would have taken on the institu-
tional might of the third branch with his Court-packing plan. 
When it appeared during the battle in the Senate over the Court-
packing bill that a compromise might be achieved in which 
Roosevelt would be allowed to appoint two new Justices, he 
pondered with several of his intimates whom he might choose, and 
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there is little doubt that uppermost in his mind was a judicial out-
look sympathetic to sustaining the New Deal legislation. 
Within four years of the defeat of the Court-packing legisla-
tion, as I have indicated, seven of the nine members of the Court 
had been appointed by Roosevelt, and in the short run the effect of 
the change in Court personnel was immediate and predictable. So-
cial and regulatory legislation, whether enacted by the states or by 
Congress, was sustained across the board against constitutional 
challenges that might have prevailed before the old Court. When 
Roosevelt in 1941 appointed Harlan F. Stone to succeed Charles 
Evan Hughes as Chief Justice, the periodical United States News 
commented that "the new head of the Court will also find no sharp 
divergence of opinion among his colleagues." The Washington Post 
echoed the same sentiment when it foresaw "for years to come" a 
"virtual unanimity on the tribunal. "9 
These forecasts proved to be entirely accurate in the area of 
economic and social legislation. But other issues began to percolate 
up through the judicial coffee pot, as they have a habit of doing. 
The Second World War, which occupied the United States from 
1941 until 1945, produced numerous lawsuits about civil liberties. 
During the war, the Court maintained a fair degree of cohesion in 
deciding most of these cases, but quite suddenly after the war, the 
predicted "virtual unanimity" was rent asunder in rancorous squab-
bling, the like of which the Court had seldom seen before. 
Some, but only some, of the differences were of judicial philos-
ophy. Understandably, seven Justices who agreed as to the appro-
priate constitutional analysis to apply to economic and social 
legislation might not agree with one another in cases involving civil 
liberties. These differences manifested themselves infrequently dur-
ing the war years but came into full bloom shortly afterwards. In a 
case called Saia v. New York,w the Court held by a vote of five-to-
four that a local ordinance of the city of Lockport, New York, regu-
lating the use of sound trucks in city parks, was unconstitutional. 
Four of the five Justices in the majority were appointees of Franklin 
Roosevelt, but so were three of the four Justices in the minority. 
Seven months later the Court all but overruled the Saia case in Ko-
vacs v. Cooper, 11 with one of the Saia majority defecting to join the 
four dissenters for the Kovacs majority. These two cases provide 
but one of abundant examples of similar episodes in the Court's ad-
judication during the period from 1945 to 1949. 
9. A. MASON, HARLAN FISKE STONE: PILLAR OF THE LAW 576 (1956). 
10. 334 U.S. 558 (1948). 
11. 336 u.s. 77 (1949). 
1985] PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS 327 
In 1949, two events of rather dramatic importance for Court-
watchers, if not for the public at large, occurred within a few 
months of each other. In July of that year, Justice Frank Murphy 
died at the age of 59, after having served on the Court for ten years. 
In September, Justice Wiley Rutledge died at the age of 55, after 
having served on the Court for six years. Both of these deaths may 
fairly be described as untimely, and the terms of service of both 
Justices Murphy and Rutledge were substantially below the average 
for Supreme Court Justices. 
Ironically, these two appointees were the most "liberal" of all 
the Roosevelt appointees on issues such as civil rights and civil lib-
erties. Harry Truman, then President, replaced them with Justices 
Tom Clark and Sherman Minton, respectively, who had no doubts 
about the constitutionality of New Deal economic and social legisla-
tion, but who had quite different views of the relationship of the 
Constitution to civil liberties and civil rights claims from those of 
Justices Murphy and Rutledge. Here was an element of blind 
chance that frustrated at least in part the unanimity that had been 
predicted for the so-called Roosevelt Court: two of President 
Roosevelt's eight appointees died well before they might have been 
expected to die, permitting another President to fill the vacancies. 
One is reminded of the statement of William Howard Taft, speaking 
with newspaper reporters as he stepped down from the Presidency. 
Numbering among his most important presidential acts the appoint-
ment of six Justices to the Supreme Court, Taft said he had told 
these Justices: "If any of you die, I'll disown you." 
The final factor that frustrated President Roosevelt's complete 
success in his effort to pack the Supreme Court was a deep personal 
animosity that developed among several of his appointees. It origi-
nally arose between Justice Black and Justice Jackson, but then 
spread to ally Justice Douglas with Justice Black and Justice Frank-
furter with Justice Jackson. The first public manifestation of this 
animosity was buried in the minute orders denying rehearing in the 
Jewell Ridge case when the Supreme Court adjourned for the sum-
mer in June 1945. The petition for rehearing claimed that Justice 
Black should have disqualified himself in that five-to-four decision 
because it was argued by his one-time law partner; Justice Jackson's 
insistence upon separately stating his views as to the petition for 
rehearing caused a deep rift between the two Justices. 
This unedifying controversy resurfaced the following spring in 
1946. Chief Justice Stone died suddenly in April of that year, and 
President Truman delayed filling the vacancy for a number of 
weeks. Justice Jackson was at this time Special Prosecutor for the 
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United States at the Nuremberg Trials of the Nazi war criminals. 
He had just wound up his many months' work in Germany, but had 
not yet returned to the United States. In early June, President Tru-
man announced the appointment of Fred M. Vinson as Chief Jus-
tice, and four days later Justice Jackson released an unprecedented 
statement to the press in Europe, although it was addressed nomi-
nally to the chairmen of the House and Senate Judiciary Commit-
tees. Jackson then, responding to what he thought were inspired 
columns in the Washington press reflecting Black's view of the con-
troversy over the Jewell Ridge case, released to the public all the 
gory details of that case in a light favorable to him. The reaction of 
the American press and public was one of astonishment that Jack-
son would air dirty linen in this manner, and of "a plague on both 
your houses" insofar as the Black-Jackson "blood feud" was 
concerned. 
Jackson and his ally, Frankfurter, had voted differently from 
Black and his ally, Douglas, in some of the cases to come before the 
Court before the Jewell Ridge controversy, but one cannot help 
wondering whether the bitter public antagonism generated by that 
case exacerbated these differences. The expected "near unanimity" 
that the Roosevelt appointees were supposed to bring to the Court 
was frustrated by these antagonisms as well as by the other factors 
that I have mentioned. 
Thus history teaches us, I think, that even a "strong" President 
determined to leave his mark on the Court-a President such as 
Lincoln or Franklin Roosevelt-is apt to be only partially success-
ful. Neither the President nor his appointees can foresee what is-
sues will come before the Court during the tenure of the appointees, 
and it may be that none has thought very much about these issues. 
Even though they agree as to the proper resolution of current cases, 
they may well disagree as to future cases involving other questions 
when, as judges, they study briefs and hear arguments. Longevity 
of the appointees, or untimely deaths such as those of Justice Mur-
phy and Justice Rutledge, may also frustrate a President's expecta-
tions; so also may the personal antagonisms developed between 
strong-willed appointees of the same President. 
All of these factors are subsumed to a greater or lesser extent 
by observing that the Supreme Court is an institution far more 
dominated by centrifugal forces, pushing towards individuality and 
independence, than it is by centripetal forces pulling for hierarchal 
ordering and institutional unity. The well-known checks and bal-
ances provided by the framers of the Constitution have supplied the 
necessary centrifugal force to make the Supreme Court independent 
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of Congress and the President. The degree to which a new Justice 
should change his way of looking at things when he "puts on the 
robe" is emphasized by the fact that Supreme Court appointments 
almost invariably come "one at a time," and each new appointee 
goes alone to take his place with eight colleagues who are already 
there. Unlike his freshman counterpart in the House of Representa-
tives, where if there has been a strong political tide running at the 
time of a particular election there may be as many as forty or fifty 
new members who form a bloc and cooperate with one another, the 
new judicial appointee brings no cohorts with him. 
A second series of centrifugal forces is at work within the 
Court itself, pushing each member of the Court to be thoroughly 
independent of his colleagues. The Chief Justice has some authority 
that the Associate Justices do not have, but this is relatively insig-
nificant compared to the extraordinary independence that each Jus-
tice has from every other Justice. Tenure is assured no matter how 
one votes in any given case; one is independent not only of public 
opinion, of the President, and of Congress, but of one's eight col-
leagues as well. When one puts on the robe, one enters a world of 
public scrutiny and professional criticism which sets great store by 
individual performance, and much less store upon the virtue of be-
ing a "team player." 
James Madison, in his pre-presidential days when he was 
authoring political tracts, said: 
But the great security against a gradual concentration of the several powers in 
the same department, consists in giving to those who administer each department, 
the necessary constitutional means, and personal motives, to resist encroachments 
of the others. The provision for defence must in this, as in all other cases, be made 
commensurate to the danger of attack. Ambition must be made to counteract ambi-
tion. The interest of the man must be connected with the constitutional rights of 
the place.12 
Madison, of course, was talking about the principles necessary 
to secure independence of one branch of the government from an-
other. But he might equally well have been talking about princi-
ples, at least in the case of the Supreme Court of the United States, 
designed to weaken and diffuse the outside loyalties of any new ap-
pointee, and to gradually cause that appointee to identify his inter-
ests in the broadest sense not merely with the institution to which 
he is appointed, but to his own particular place within the institu-
tion. Here again, this remarkable group of fifty-some men who met 
in Philadelphia in the summer of 1787 seems to have created the 
separate branches of the federal government with consummate skill. 
12. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 349 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961). 
330 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 2:319 
The Supreme Court is to be independent of the legislative and exec-
utive branches of the government; yet by reason of vacancies occur-
ring on that Court, it is to be subjected to indirect infusions of the 
popular will in terms of the President's use of his appointment 
power. But the institution is so structured that a brand new presi-
dential appointee, perhaps feeling himself strongly loyal to the Pres-
ident who appointed him, and looking for colleagues of a similar 
mind on the Court, is immediately beset with the institutional pres-
sures that I have described. He identifies more and more strongly 
with the new institution of which he has become a member, and he 
learns how much store is set by his behaving independently of his 
colleagues. I think it is these institutional effects, as much as any-
thing, that have prevented even strong Presidents from being any 
more than partially successful when they sought to "pack" the 
Supreme Court. 
